Het grote peak oil citaten topic

Mechanieker

Hallo.

In deze topic zou ik graag een lijst willen bijhouden van citaten van invloedrijke, hoogdeskundige of bekende personen in de wereld aangaande Peak Oil en daaraan gerelateerde onderwerpen. Het gaat mij hier dus om mensen die een hoge maatschappelijke positie hebben in de sfeer van politiek, wetenschap, bedrijfsleven, overheid, kennisinstituten, of vanwege grote populariteit, dus mensen als Al Gore. Graag met een quote, het jaar van de uitspraak en zomogelijk een bronvermelding erbij!

Ik begin de lijst met de volgende citaten:

What I can tell you is that one day global conventional oil will peak I think it is going to peak very soon. The main problem here is that the existing fields, many mature fields, are declining.

bron - Foreign Policy

Expansion becomes impossible without abundant cheap energy. So I think that the debt of the world is going bad. That speaks of a financial crisis, unseen, probably equalling the Great Depression of 1930; its probable we face the Second Great Depression. It would be a chain reaction, one bank would fail, and another one would fail, industries will close

bron - Youtube

Peak oil is at hand with low availability growth for the next 5 to 10 years. Once worldwide petroleum production peaks, geopolitics and market economics will result in even more significant price increases and security risks. To guess where this is all going to take us is would be too speculative.

bron - PDF

The end-of-the-fossil-hydrocarbons scenario is not a doom-and-gloom picture painted by pessimistic end-of-the-world prophets, but a view of scarcity in the coming years and decades that must be taken seriously.

bron - PDF

This is an apocalyptic scenario. In terms of industrial production, in terms of the food supply but above all in the terms of the transportation sector, we cannot continue as we now are.

bron - Film recensie

"The British National Party" schreef:As oil prices rise, it will be millions who suffer, millions of ordinary people who are just trying to get on with their lives, millions of ordinary decent people will be forced into states of anxiety, depression, fear and anger.

Voters take to new ideas, even radically new ideas when the system that they have trusted, worked with, admired and felt comfortable with falls apart.

Peak Oil may well be an important catalyst that helps us to win political power because we are the ones talking about it now.

bron

Dus als je tijdens het kranten lezen of internet-surfen nog relevante uitspraken tegenkomt afkomstig van onze leiders, opiniemakers, wetenschappers, hoge ambtenaren, schrijvers: graag hier even een vermelding plaatsen!

Alvast bedankt en groet,

M

Adpruys

After World War I, the United States was shaken by predictions of the exhaustion of domestic oil. Even the head of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)— among many others—delivered a verdict of gloom in 1919: The country would run out of oil within 9 years! (...)

All these factors partly explain why the life-index of world reserves (gauged as the ratio between proven oil re-serves and current production) has constantly improved, passing from 20 years in 1948 to 35 years in 1972 and reaching about 40 years in 2003.

2004 Leonardo Maugeri

The growing supply of energy should not lead us to underestimate the longer-term challenge of providing energy for a growing world economy. At this point, even with greater efficiency, it looks as though the world could be using 50 percent more oil 25 years from now. That is a very big challenge. But at least for the next several years, the growing production capacity will take the air out of the fear of imminent shortage. And that in turn will provide us the breathing space to address the investment needs and the full panoply of technologies and approaches -- from development to conservation -- that will be required to fuel a growing world economy, ensure energy security and meet the needs of what is becoming the global middle class.

Daniel Yergin, 2005

the Hubbert method fails because it takes recoverable (not total) resources as fixed, and assumes that to be the area under the curve of total production. When the estimate of the area under the curve (resources) is increased, the entire increase must be applied to future production. This is exactly what is happening with Campbell, as Figure 15 shows. The errors in his 1991 forecast and the adjustments he has made in his latest work are thus predicted by Lynch (1996). Campbell has not provided an alternative explanation, merely ignored them. And as Figure 18 shows, his forecast is well outside the mainstream.

Short-term prices will certainly fluctuate, and we will surely have more oil crises, since they are short-term events. ^{Unfortunately, there is little doubt that the certain failure of the current Cassandras will be forgotten within a few years and a new round of alarms will be sounded.}

Michael C. Lynch, 1998

In contrast to a widely discussed theory that world oil production will soon reach a peak and go into sharp decline, a new analysis of the subject by Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) finds that the remaining global oil resource base is actually 3.74 trillion barrels -- three times as large as the 1.2 trillion barrels estimated by the theory’s proponents -- and that the “peak oil” argument is based on faulty analysis which could, if accepted, distort critical policy and investment decisions and cloud the debate over the energy future

imageDisplay.ashx.gif (14.99 KiB) 1926 keer bekeken

CERA (Jackson ên Yergin), 2006.

Knockingonheavensdoor

Zou Colin Campbell het boek van de econoom Hawken gelezen hebben ?

citaat:

"Ik denk dat de productie van gemakkelijke olie al over zijn hoogtepunt heen is". Bron: Jeroen van der Veer, bestuursvoorzitter van Shell (2006).

Adpruys schreef:Quote

In contrast to a widely discussed theory that world oil production will soon reach a peak and go into sharp decline, a new analysis of the subject by Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) finds that the remaining global oil resource base is actually 3.74 trillion barrels -- three times as large as the 1.2 trillion barrels estimated by the theorys proponents -- and that the peak oil argument is based on faulty analysis which could, if accepted, distort critical policy and investment decisions and cloud the debate over the energy

Offtopic, maar de industrie-adviseur CERA moet toch gecorrigeerd worden op zijn 'wishful thinking', al was het maar voor de enkele 'verdwaalde' politicus of overheidsadviseur die dit forum leest:

Enig idee wat bedoeld wordt met de ruim '2,5 trillion barrels unconventional oil' en met welke snelheid deze nu wordt geproduceerd en wat deskundigen verwachten wat dat in 2020 kan worden ?

Adpruys

CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

Knockingonheavensdoor

Adpruys schreef:CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

De produktie die zij voorspellen uit onconventionele olie is onmogelijk en volstrekt belachelijk. Zij houden geen rekening met de mogelijke snelheid van produktie. CERA was altijd optimistischer dan het optimistische IEA. En het IEA heeft de afgelopen jaren elk jaar weer hun voorspellingen van produktie naar beneden moeten bijstellen. Voor gedegen analyses moeten de overheden bij TOD en ASPO zijn. Voor wishful thinking bij het CERA en het, nu in mindere mate, IEA.

Knockingonheavensdoor

citaat:

" People are genetically-programmed to look for discrepancies and alternatives when their personal fitness appears to be in decline. That is why political change is always impossible before it's too late to avoid collapse". - Jay Hanson

Knockingonheavensdoor

citaat:

"Ik ben bedroefd dat het politiek lastig erkennen is wat iedereen weet: de oorlog in Irak gaat grotendeels om olie."

- Alan Greenspan, oud-voorzitter Federal Reserve, in zijn biografie The age of turbulence (2007).

Knockingonheavensdoor

Citaat:

'Voor de olie-industrie geldt natuurlijk dat wij als industrie al meer dan honderd jaar te maken hebben met het probleem dat als je eenmaal olie hebt gevonden en het uit de grond pompt, je meteen op zoek moet gaan naar meer of je gaat failliet. Het produceren van olie is immers een zichzelf uitputtende acitiviteit. Ieder jaar moet je reserves vinden en ontwikkelen die gelijk zijn aan je produktie, alleen om op hetzelfde punt te blijven. Dit geldt niet alleen voor bedrijven maar in bredere economische zin voor de hele wereld. Een nieuw fusiebedrijf als Exxon-Mobil moet ieder jaar meer dan anderhalf miljard vaten aan nieuwe reserves olie-equivalenten verwerven om de bestaande produktie te kunnen handhaven. Het is alsof je honderd procent rente betaalt; je moet elke vier maanden een nieuw groot veld van zo'n 500 miljoen vaten olie ontdekken. Wat de mondiale vraag naar olie betreft wordt er van oliebedrijven verwacht dat ze voldoende olie blijven vinden en produceren om onze olieconsumptie van meer dan 71 miljoen vaten per dag te dekken, maar ook om aan de stijgende vraag te voldoen. Sommige schattingen gaan ervan uit dat de wereldwijde olievraag de komende jaren met gemiddeld 2 procent per jaar zal stijgen, terwijl tegelijkertijd de natuurlijke produktiedaling van bestaande reserves minimaal 3 procent bedraagt. Dat betekent dat we tegen 2010 om en nabij 50 miljoen vaten per dag extra nodig hebben. Maar waar moet die olie vandaan komen ? Circa 90 procent van de reserves is in handen van overheden en staatsoliebedrijven. Olie blijft in hoofdzaak een overheidsaangelegenheid. Terwijl vele regio's in de wereld grote mogelijkheden bieden op het gebied van olie, is het Midden-Oosten met twee derde van de wereldoliereserves en de laagste kosten nog steeds waar de grote prijs te vinden is, maar hoewel bedrijven graag meer toegang tot dat gebied zouden krijgen, wordt er nog altijd weinig vooruitgang geboekt.'

- Vicepresident Dick Cheney tijdens een speech aan de London Institute of Petroleum Autumn lunch in 1999.

Adpruys, adviseurs van de overheid en ambtenaren,

Deze waarheden wat betreft belangrijke cijfers bewijzen dat CERA verkeerde informatie verstrekt, omdat het 'not done' is te moeten toegeven dat 'business as usual' niet 'eeuwig' kan doorgaan. Als je weet wat de produktiehoeveelheid van onconventionele olie is, nu en in 2020, dan weet je direct dat de bijdrage daarvan gering is (veel minder dan 10 miljoen vaten per dag). Er zijn triljoenen vaten onconventionele olie, maar het gaat om de produktiesnelheid. Coal to liquids zal in 2020 hooguit enkele miljoenen vaten olie per dag leveren.

De produktiedaling van bestaande velden combinerend met het gegeven dat de olievondsten afnemen betekent dat er slechts één conclusie mogelijk is: de grafiek van CERA is nonsens. Bovendien misdadig misleidend.

Knockingonheavensdoor

Nog enkele citaten, gecopieerd van de ODAC-site. Alarmerende, minder alarmerende en 'neutrale'. Meestal is de conclusie: de tijd dringt (en de onrust stijgt).

Peak Oil Quotes

Statements by key individuals 2008

Katsuaki Watanabe, President, Toyota June 2008

"Our view is that oil production will peak in the near future. We need to develop power train(s) for alternative energy sources."

T. Boone Pickens, Chair BP Capital Management hedge fund 17th June 2008

"I do believe we have peaked out at 85 million barrels a day globally,"

Shokri Ghanem head of Libya's National Oil Corporation, 8th June 2008

The easy, cheap oil is over. Peak oil is looming.

Jeroem van de Veer CEO of Shell, 22nd January 2008

Shell estimates that after 2015 supplies of easy-to-access oil and gas will no longer keep up with demand.

Rick Wagoner - GM Chairman and Chief Exec, at the Detroit Motor Show, 13th January, 2008

"There is no doubt demand for oil is outpacing supply at a rapid pace, and has been for some time now,...As a business necessity and an obligation to society we need to develop alternative sources of propulsion."

Dave OReilly - Chevron, 15th February 2008.

"We're seeing the beginnings of a bidding war for Middle Eastern oil between east and west,"

Fatih Birol - IEA, writing in The Independent 2nd March 2008 We are on the brink of a new energy order. Over the next few decades, our reserves of oil will start to run out and it is imperative that governments in both producing and consuming nations prepare now for that time. We should not cling to crude down to the last drop we should leave oil before it leaves us. That means new approaches must be found soon..... The really important thing is that even though we are not yet running out of oil, we are running out of time.

George W. Bush, March 5th 2008 "We gotta get off oil, American has got to change its habits,".. "It should be obvious to all, demand has outstripped supply, which makes prices go up."

James W. Buckee -Retired President and CEO of Talisman Energy Inc., 29th January 2008. "If you think that at the moment the world is consuming 30-plus billion barrels a year of oil and is finding seven or eight billion barrels a year, and this state of affairs has been going on now for 20 or more years. "It's obviously unsustainable and the world is increasingly drawing on the bigger, older fields. You couple that notion with the irreversibility of decline and you've got a very alarming picture."

Jeremy Leggett and Shell - Advertisement appeared in Time Europe Edition, one of the CNN Principal Voices series, 31st March 2008 A premature topping point in global oil production would wipe out economic plans currently on offer in boardrooms and finance ministries around the world. This is because such plans assume growing supplies of affordable oil for several decades to come.

2007

Sadad al-Huseini - former head of exploration and production at Saudi Aramco, 31st October, 2007 The evidence is that in spite of the increases - very large increases - in oil prices over the last four years, we haven't been able to match that with increasing capacity. So, essentially, we are on a plateau.

Christophe de Margerie - CEO Total, 30/31st October 2007. "100m barrels per day is now in my view an optimistic case"

Fatih Birol - IEA, interviewed in Le Monde, June 2007 From now to 2015, the market and the oil industry will be severely tested. In the next five to ten years, oil production from non-OPEC producers will reach a peak before starting to decline, for lack of sufficient reserves. As each day passes, new evidence of this fact appears. At the same time the peak of the economic expansion phase of China will take place. The two events will coincide: the explosion of the growth of the Chinese demand, and the fall in production of non-OPEC oil. Will our oil system be it able to answer this challenge, that is the question. If production does not increase in Iraq in an exponential way between now and 2015, we have a very big problem, even if Saudi Arabia meets its obligations. The figures are very simple, you do not need to be an expert. It is enough to know how to do a subtraction. China will grow very quickly, India also, and even Saudi Arabia projections of the 3 Mb/day will not be enough to meet the rise of Chinese demand.

Lord Oxburgh- former CEO of Shell, September 2007 ...youve got three main variables: rising world demand, and its a bit hard to predict exactly how fast that is going to rise; how much oil is going to be available; and how fast substitutes for oil come to market (synthetic fuels can be made in quite a number of ways). But all of that said I dont think this is going to happen in the next five years, and I would be surprised if the difficulties ahead had not really emerged within the next twenty.

The message in short is that we are just about to enter hot water, quite serious hot water. And the danger is that we sit there blissfully like the frog in the pan of water gently heating on the stove until as the Irish would say it wakes up to find itself dead. In other words we may be sleepwalking into a problem which is actually going to be very serious and that it may be too late to do anything about it by the time we are fully aware.

2005

Dr. James Schlesinger - former US Energy Secretary, 16th November 2005 In the longer run, unless we take serious steps to prepare for the day that we can no longer increase production of conventional oil, we are faced with the possibility of a major economic shockand the political unrest that would ensue.

Dave OReilly - CEO, Chevron in their Real Issues Ad, 12th July 2005 Energy will be one of the defining issues of this century. One thing is clear: the era of easy oil is over. What we all do next will determine How well we meet the energy needs of the entire world in this century and beyond. It took us 125 years to use the first trillion barrels of oil. Well use the next trillion in 30.

References from the press

2008

The Independent Lead Article, 28th April 2008 In the broader context, this crisis must be seen as part of the global energy squeeze. It has been clear for some time that global demand for oil has been outstripping supply. That is what is pushing up prices around the world. That a relatively minor industrial dispute such as this can have such a knock-on effect demonstrates how dependent Britain is on a relatively small number of supply outlets. The Grangemouth dispute will eventually, no doubt, be settled, but the chronic crisis of our economy's total reliance on environmentally damaging and dwindling oil supplies will continue.

Financial Times Lead Article, 17th April 2008 Preparing for the age of peak oil - Russia's vast oil and gas reserves were seen not so long ago as the best hope of meeting growing world energy demand. No more. This week a top Russian oil executive echoed earlier official warnings that oil production could fall for the first time in a decade."

2007

Independent, 17th September 2007 Oil Industry Sleepwalking into crisis - Former Shell chairman says that diminishing resources could push price of crude to $150 a barrel

CNNMoney.com 7th August 2007 Why oil won't hit $100 - New production, new energy sources and some conservation could push down prices by 2010 - but don't expect $20 a barrel anytime soon.

William Rees Mogg, The Times, 16th July 2007 Oil ruled the 20th century; the shortage of oil will rule the 21st. There is now no doubt about the rising trend of oil prices.

Financial Times, 10th July 2007 World will face oil crunch in five years IEA says supply falling faster than expected.

Bij alle citaten kan het originele artikel opgezocht worden met een muisklik.

Knockingonheavensdoor

De produktie die zij voorspellen uit onconventionele olie is onmogelijk en volstrekt belachelijk. Zij houden geen rekening met de mogelijke snelheid van produktie. CERA was altijd optimistischer dan het optimistische IEA. En het IEA heeft de afgelopen jaren elk jaar weer hun voorspellingen van produktie naar beneden moeten bijstellen. Voor gedegen analyses moeten de overheden bij TOD en ASPO zijn. Voor wishful thinking bij het CERA en het, nu in mindere mate, IEA.

Reactie op mijn eigen bericht: ik had de door Pruys geplaatste grafiek beter moeten bekijken alvorens commentaar te leveren. De produktievoorspelling uit onconventionele olie is NIET afkomstig van het CERA, maar uit Azië. Men moet zich echter afvragen waar de olie vandaan komt om de sterk stijgende lijn te verkrijgen tot 2015 die CERA publiceert. Twee factoren spelen hierbij een rol. In de jaren '90 was er een gebrek aan investeringen EN de piek van ontdekkingen was in 1965. Meestal volgt de piek van produktie rond de 40 jaar later dan de piek van ontdekking. Dat houdt in dat als er in de jaren '90 veel meer was geinvesteerd, het produktieplateau hoger zou zijn geworden en enkele jaren later zijn begonnen. De vraag is of de wereld dan beter af zou zijn geweest dan nu. Ik denk van niet, want hoe hoger de top, hoe harder de val.

Nu wordt het lastig het produktierecord van juli 2008 te overtreffen: door de recessie en de lage olieprijs worden projecten uitgesteld en er is de produktieafname van jaarlijks ongeveer 4 mbd uit bestaande velden.

Knockingonheavensdoor

Adpruys schreef:CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

Wie heeft er gelijk: de CERA of TOD, ASPO en ODAC ?

THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

Imagine for the moment that a large group of apple orchards represents the worlds oil fields (apples being the oil). As frugivores, we care about the rate at which apples can be picked in one orchard (and all orchards) and delivered to the grocer. CERA type analysis is focused on counting how many total apples are in all the orchards, including the wormy ones (heavy oil), the ones on top of trees requiring heavy equipment to pick (oil sands) and the ones on farmers land they have never been allowed onto, but take the word of the farmer how many apples he has (middle east). They also are including oranges (coal-to liquids), pears (oil shale) and kumquats (ethanol) to come up with their 'apple resource'. Even if we can and should count all these fruits as apples, the rate at which our apple picking resources can extract the apples and get them to the supermarket is a far more limiting statistic than the number of apples in the orchards. Plus many of our recipes just don't taste as good using kumquats.

The second half of oil(or even 3/4 according to CERA) will follow vastly different rules than the first half. Deeper wells in more remote, sensitive locations, heavier, sourer oil, growing populations and internal consumption in exporting countries, lack of skilled oil personnel and geologists, geopolitical conflict, hurricanes in new exploration areas, expensive rigs, environmental limitations, first nation disputes, lack of upstream capital expenditures, etc will all contribute to actual production being unlikely to match 'productive capacity'. Again, maybe it will. But maybe it won't. And the flow rate of liquid fuels is what makes the world economy run, not how much is conceivably underground.

THE TIMING OF PEAK OIL IS SO IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE TIME LAGS REQUIRED FOR MITIGATION

The worlds transportation (and therefore food) system is utterly dependent on oil. In the DOE funded Hirsch Report, the economist authors made it very clear that the Peaking of global oil production was a monumental task and would require 20 years! lead time to effectively mitigate (noticeably absent from the report were environmental consequences of the choices of mitigation). Even at 10 year lead time they predicted liquid fuel shortfalls. In other words, this is not a problem that we can solve overnight.

CONCLUSIONS

In the era of fossil fuel use and depletion, much uncertainty and confusion still exists in policy circles and the general public as to the urgency of the situation. CERA, historically respected in oil supply analysis, is in my opinion providing detailed maps to the wrong destinations. In the only category that really matters in the Peak Oil debate, net liquid fuel available to non-energy producing society, there is ample evidence suggesting a much nearer peak. Indeed, some respected sources say we have peaked already. This is not a binomial equation. An imminent peak or a peak in 2040 (CERAs projection) have dramatically different risk profiles for society. The best case scenario brewed by conflating reserves with

> resources, net energy with gross energy, capacity with flow-rates and ignoring the environment makes for a sweet tasting drink. But should we be drinking it?

(**I admit the possibility that although I am looking 2 steps ahead CERA might be looking 3 steps ahead, meaning they are part of an intentional effort to make the 2040 peak message take hold, so that societal uncertainty and pell-mell policy doesn't disrupt needed upstream investment. But I think it more likely they, and others, are just too narrowly focused in the boundaries of their analysis.)

Actual production can and will differ dramatically from productive capacity. To base decade lag time decisions (like changing transportation infrastructure to more electric, and relocalizing certain basic goods manufacturing) on best case scenarios is foolhardy. What is the risk reward scenario of such decisions? If CERA is right and we get to some 120 mbpd (net)of oil, all the better to use it for an early transition. If they are wrong or potentially WAY wrong, then the complacency in corporate circles from CERA and EIA optimism will mean we have missed our chance to prepare.

To focus on a particular productive capacity or even flow rate are the wrong goals, because at 120 mpbd of lower quality oil, we will be stealing from both the environment and the economy. Using dollars to forecast costs is

using a moving target. If tar sands are profitable at $32 with oil at $55, will the cost be $132 when oil is $155? Or even higher given wide boundary costs? Money, research and effort needs to go towards a better accounting and estimation of the energy costs of extracting our remaining fossil fuels.

bron: TOD (The Oil Drum)

Knockingonheavensdoor

Adpruys schreef:CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

Het is opmerkelijk dat de CERA nu de meer sombere voorspellingen begint aan te nemen. Ze geven toe dat hun vorige verwachtingen veel te optimistisch waren (zoals, in mindere mate, ook gold voor het IEA en de EIA). Hun 'juiste' analyses blijken toch niet te kloppen.

Hieronder enkele belangrijke alinea's van een publicatie op 'Theoildrum'. Het staat los van mijn opmerking over CERA, hun 'change of mind' is in een ander artikel te lezen.

Non OPEC-12 Oil Production Peaked in 2004

Posted by ace on February 23, 2009 - 9:36am

Topic: Supply/Production

Tags: non-opec, oil production, original, peak oil

Non OPEC-12 oil production peaked in 2004 at 46.8 million barrels/day (mbd) shown in the chart below. This oil definition includes crude oil, lease condensate, oil sands and natural gas plant liquids. If natural gas plant liquids are excluded, then the production peak remains in 2004 but decreases to 42.1 mbd.

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) should make official statements about declining non OPEC-12 oil production to renew the focus on oil conservation and alternative energy sources.

There is recent increasing concern about non OPEC peaking in 2007. In February 2009, Merril Lynch stated that non OPEC total liquids production may have already peaked in 2007. Colin Campbell's January 2009 newsletter is forecasting that non OPEC production has passed peak in 2007, excluding bio-fuels. Halliburton also believes that non OPEC production may have peaked in 2007 as indicated by a statement from their Q4 2008 earnings call transcript: "Non-OPEC production fell in 2008 and is likely to decline in 2009. Russia, which accounted for the majority of the increase in non-OPEC production in the past decade contracted in 2008 and will likely do so again in 2009."

Next, I decided to send emails to the supply forecasters and senior executives at the EIA and the IEA asking the following question.

Do you think that non OPEC-12 crude oil, lease condensate and oil sands production has passed its peak five years ago in 2004 at 42.1 mbd?

The IEA's response, after several emails, was very poor. The only response was to refer me to their publications of which Table 11.1 from the IEA WEO 2008 has some useful data points. Non OPEC-13 crude and condensate production data was given for years 2000, 2007 and 2015. Indonesian production was added to these data to get Non OPEC-12 crude and condensate for these three years. Data from the IEA's Oil Market Report was used to estimate production for the missing years from 2001 to 2006 and 2008. Historic oil sands data were also sourced from the IEA WEO 2008. Based on these estimates, the IEA data show a crude, condensate and oil sands production peak in 2004 of 41.7 mbd, as in the chart below.

The EIA's answer to the question was that "the non OPEC-12 production path when considered in the context of market events does not support the conclusion that non OPEC-12 production peaked in 2004. We have not seen the future data points yet." Nevertheless, the EIA provided an historical and forecast data extract for non OPEC-12 crude, condensate and oil sands production from their Annual Energy Outlook 2009 Early Release. Similar to the IEA data, a crude, condensate and oil sands production peak is shown also in 2004 at 42.1 mbd. The EIA projections are more optimistic than the IEA.

Notwithstanding the recent suspension of many oil sands projects, the EIA's optimistic oil sands projection is 1.9 mbd in 2010 and 2.8 mbd in 2015. The December 2008 report from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) titled Interim Update: 2008 - 2020 Western Canadian Crude Oil Forecast projects lower oil sands production of 1.5 mbd in 2010 and 2.4 mbd in 2015. If CAPP's oil sands data were used in the chart below then the EIA crude, condensate and oil sands forecast would show a decline from 2008 to 2015 rather than a bumpy plateau. The CAPP forecast will probably need to be revised further downward as the IEA is now forecasting oil sands production for 2009 at 1.34 mbd which is 0.10 mbd less than the corresponding CAPP number.

Both the EIA and the IEA continue to forecast increasing non OPEC total liquids supply as shown by the EIA STEO and IEA WEO 2008. However, non OPEC-12 crude, condensate and oil sands production has almost certainly passed peak in 2004. If the EIA and the IEA were to make official statements agreeing with this 2004 peak then this should help raise awareness of decreasing oil production and potentially increase the focus on oil conservation and alternative energy sources. As non OPEC-12 production decreases there will be a much greater dependence upon OPEC which will strengthen its market position.

I urge everyone to send emails to the EIA and the IEA asking the question below which might persuade them to make official statements acknowledging this 2004 production peak.

Do you think that non OPEC-12 crude oil, lease condensate and oil sands production has passed its peak five years ago in 2004 at 42.1 mbd?

Relevant EIA email addresses can be found on this EIA contact page and those for the IEA on the Oil Market Report contact page.

Knockingonheavensdoor

Adpruys schreef:CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

http://www.energybulletin.net/node/48160

Nog even 'doorzeuren' over de juiste analyses van de CERA. Gezien het grote belang ervan voor o.a. beleidsbepalers. En gezien het grote gevaar voor de mensheid een blind geloof te behouden in dit soort instanties. Gelukkig 'luisteren' de landen die in rap tempo windmolenparken uit de grond (gaan) stampen en willen beginnen met de massa-produktie van electrische auto's niet naar de CERA al is de vraag wat hun motivatie is om dit te doen. Wat betreft uitspraken van figuren als Yergin zou het volgende kunnen gelden (citaat uit het blad Quest braintainment nr.15 Psychologie): "mensen die liegen worden aardiger gevonden dan mensen die eerlijk zijn. De leugenaar is populair. Mensen met veel principes liegen relatief weinig." In dit licht kunnen ook veel uitspraken van OPEC oliebazen gehouden worden lijkt mij.

Citaat:

Impressive track record?

It is surprising the kind of standing CERA has among politicians and the media, given their track record. If you look at the report they published in May of 2005 their forecast for 2005 was a capacity of 87.85 million b/d. Yet by the release of CERAs October report in 2008 the 2005 figure had been revised down by 1.4 million b/d to 86,45. Not very impressive real time data.

CERA makes a big issue out of their fantastic database, that it is why their forecasts are so superior to everyone elses. If they are far away from other forecasts the reason is simply that they claim they have much better data to back up their views.

It is therefore an interesting experiment to size them up in a country where the data is simple, transparent and public, and where a better database therefore is not really a competitive edge. Let us take Norway. In their 2005 report they were expecting Norway to produce 3 million b/d of liquids in 2010. In their 2006 update this figure had been revised up to 3.15 million b/d.

According to the latest IEA figures and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate it is expected that Norway to produce about 2.1 million b/d in 2010. This actually means that in 2006 CERA was more than 50% too high in their estimate for capacity 4 years down the road for a country with relatively few fields and the most transparent and public statistics in the world.

The UK is also a fairly transparent country. In CERAs 2005 report the UK should have a capacity of 2.1 million b/d by 2010. According to the latest forecast from the IEA the production in 2010 will be 1.2 million b/d. This time they are 75 percent too high.

When they are that much off in such a near future in transparent countries like Norway and the UK, how likely is it that their forecast for countries like Azerbaijan or Iran 10 years into the future are meaningful at all?

Citaat:

They are not 'bad apples' as far as I can tell. Their motivations and training were 'appropriate' for economic growth conditions of previous generation - starting a few years ago (as much as a decade ago) the game began to have different (ecology/sociology as opposed to economic based) rules. Post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning reined when world economy was growing using high energy profit ratio to suppress necessity of lateral thinking, and that business would always parse the right decisions. The rules have permanently changed now and CERA/IHS methodology will in time prove to be too narrow in scope (to many it already has). This has happened often in history. These are not bad people - just outdated boundaries.

As the article noted, if CERA is that wrong about a province as transparent as the North Sea, why would we expect them to be any better regarding more difficult to evaluate areas?

However, the overall North Sea decline is proceeding exactly as the logistic (HL) model would have suggested (in 1999, the North Sea was about 50% depleted, based on HL, EIA C+C).

And Saudi Arabia is going to show three years of annual production below their 2005 production rate at about the same stage of depletion at which the prior swing producer, Texas, peaked (again based on HL).

Regarding CERA's motivation, I suspect that they are paid to generate optimistic production scenarios, so they generate optimistic production scenarios--in much the same way that the nice ladies working at the Bunny Ranch in Nevada are paid to provide a service.

I do think that the pronouncements by ExxonMobil, CERA, and OPEC that Peak Oil is decades away are doing a lot of damage to ordinary people--by encouraging them, in effect, to "Party On," by maintaining their auto-centric suburban way of life.

In any case, judge for yourself.

Knockingonheavensdoor

Adpruys schreef:CERA heeft er voornamelijk belang bij als ze gedegen en juiste analyses maakt. Hier de verklaring van Daniel Yergin voor het Amerikaanse congres toen de prijs van olie op zijn hoogtepunt was

http://www2.cera.com/news/DYergin_June2008_Testimony.pdf

Van: Drumbeat march 27, 2009. Geniet van de 'humor' van TOD lezers. Ik zou er ook hard om moeten lachen, ware het niet dat het een te serieuze kwestie is. (OTOH = on the other hand; UNG = unconventional natural gas)

Could it be that CERA and Daniel Yergin have seen the light?

Rising Fear of a Future Oil Shock

Sharp reductions in investments and low oil prices could curb future supplies by almost eight million barrels a day within the next five years, according to a study scheduled for release Friday, the latest warning that the world could face a new energy shock when the economy picks up.

The report by Cambridge Energy Research Associates, an oil consulting firm, said that the potential drop in production capacity is a "powerful and long-lasting aftershock following the oil price collapse."

The global slowdown has forced oil companies to slash their investments, postpone or cancel expansion plans, or delay drilling in many corners of the world. While some of the biggest companies, like Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell, say they will keep their investments unchanged this year, many other producers are curbing investments because of the crisis.

Of course, the discussion is framed around another price shock, not a much larger, long term problem of decline in production. There's no recognition that Peak Oil will be anything other than an economic problem...

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Undertow on March 27, 2009 - 10:27am

Ah yes, but Nat Gas will save us all according to CERA

Technology Drives North American Gas Renaissance: New CERA Analysis

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., Mar 23, 2009 (BUSINESS WIRE) ----North American natural gas is entering a new era in which supply is no longer constrained, according to a new Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA: undefined, undefined, undefined%) multiclient study, Rising to the Challenge: A Study of North American Gas Supply to 2018. A revolution in technology has unlocked "unconventional" gas resources, dramatically changing the prospects for the market. Demand, rather than supply, will be the challenge for the market going forward, accentuated currently by the economic crisis.

...Given the increased productivity of unconventional wells, the study concludes that it is not necessary to increase drilling activity to maintain - or increase - production. After years of developing unconventional gas with its long-lived production, in the aggregate, the average decline rate will fall. This means, the study says, that a smaller quantity of new production is required to offset natural production declines.

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r4ndom on March 27, 2009 - 10:42am

"supply is no longer constrained"?!

Perhaps one of the "unconventional" sources is a new device that can convert stupidity into natural gas.

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steve_piper on March 27, 2009 - 11:21am

That quote had me shaking my head as well.

CERA's spin always skews to the supply/optimistic realm, where if the cup doesn't runneth over it is at least half full ... and filling fast. I map this statement as 'so much demand has been destroyed in the domestic U.S. that supply growth can be expected to lead demand for the foreseeable future (couple of years).' *Opinions subject to change without notice*

It wears you down after a while. If prices are low ... it proves current abundance! If prices are high ... look at the abundance of resources that are now profitable!

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ROCKMAN on March 27, 2009 - 12:34pm

steve et al -- My cohorts and I did more then shake our heads .we had the best laugh in months. Thanks CERA. Most know I consult for one to big UNG players. Or one who used to be before dropping our rig count from 60 to less than 10 in the last three months. Interesting that CERA says we dont have to increase drilling activity to keep production rising thanks to these long lived reserves. Truemany of these wells will produce for the next 15 or 20 years. But the fact that the recovery from the last 90% of the life of such wells will typically be less then 15% of the URR doesnt seem to catch their attention.

OTOH, I add that the big cut back in drilling won't send NG deliveries off a cliff as I once thought. My rough model shows more of a gradually declining plateau for the next few years at least. Most of the UNG wells have already declined significantly but they are a lot of them which are now in the low rate/low decline rate stage so they thus make a fairly substantial base. The new Deep Water NG coming though the Independence Hub will also moderate overall decline. But the DW fields also have a relative short peak period: 5 or 6 years.

Adpruys

Internationaal overleg over emissiereductie gaat o.a. over de hoeveelheid en evt compensatie voor sommige landen Zo ook onlangs in Copenhage

Another point of contention was the money that poorer countries will need for adaptation programmes. The UNFCCC's Least Developed Countries Fund allows rich countries to support such programmes in the poorest nations and thus meet some of that need, but to date it stands at only US$172 million. Overall, development agencies talk of a need for sums at least 100 times greater. "There is still no clarity over the scale of financial and technological resources that would be available to developing countries," said Shyam Saran, the Indian prime minister's special envoy on climate change.

Oil-exporting nations, led by Saudi Arabia, are also interested in a transfer of funds, saying they will demand compensation if a climate agreement cuts oil revenue. "We share the concern for climate change but at the same time we don't want to be a victim," Mohammad Al Sabban, an adviser to Saudi Arabia's Ministry for Petroleum and Mineral Resources, told reporters in Bonn.http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090415/ ... 8815a.html

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